period, with many industry officials citing rising liability costs as a major contributing factor.
To move beyond these anecdotes and case studies, our empirical approach considers the relationship between product liability insurance costs and various aspects of innovation using a large data set on firm behavior. The time period we consider, 1980-84, follows by two decades the emergence of the design defect doctrine and the initial period of adoption of strict liability. As a result, the liability regime reflected in the data should fully capture the behavior influenced by the central doctrines in modern product liability law.
Supporters of the current liability regime claim that liability costs provide incentives for introducing safer products and eliminating unsafe products. Liability critics suggest that the cost increases discourage innovation more generally. Although we can ascertain the nature of product research and development decisions most strongly influenced by liability costs, the efficiency properties of these results are less clear. Full resolution of the debate on efficiency requires a product-specific assessment of the risks and benefits of different designs. Some products may not provide an efficient level of safety and should be either redesigned or perhaps not marketed at all. In a perfectly competitive market, fully informed consumers will purchase only products that provide an efficient level of product safety. If, however, substantial impediments prevent efficient operation, such as systematic misperception of accident risks or substantial consumer search costs, market outcomes will not be optimal.
Tort liability can potentially foster greater efficiency in these contexts, particularly since the negligence doctrine and the risk-utility test for strict liability are analogous to benefit-cost tests for product safety.3 However, the strict liability test imposes additional obligations that require the producer to insure the victim's losses, so that the standard may be binding even when the firm's level of precaution is efficient.4 Moreover, some legal scholars raise the fundamental issue of whether juries are qualified to assess the economic merits of alternative product designs. These ambiguities make it difficult to ascribe efficiency properties to the product liability-innovation linkage. Our primary emphasis will be on documenting the effects of product liability rather than on drawing specific conclusions regarding their economic efficiency.
The analysis focuses on product R & D intensity as the measure of 3Much of the work of Landes and Posner (1987) and Shavell (1987) deals with the efficiency properties of many legal rules in this area. 4 
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(1991b) explores in greater detail the inadequacies of the risk-utility test from an efficiency standpoint and proposes a reformulation of that test based on an efficiency-oriented approach. innovative activity and on two different measures of product liability costs. Most noteworthy is the robustness of the findings across the different dimensions of the product liability-innovation linkage. For the majority of business units in our sample, product liability increases product R & D intensity. This result lends support to the claim that higher liability burdens provide incentives for product safety improvements. There is, however, a nonlinearity in the product liability-innovation relationship. At high levels of liability costs, liability reduces innovative activity. In the third general empirical result, more pronounced effects for product innovation relative to process innovation reflect the increasingly prominent role of the design defect doctrine.
II. Conceptual Framework
Product liability enters most economic models by simply raising the expected costs associated with product risks. Liability costs play a limited role in models based on risk-neutral consumers acting on perfect information, actuarially fair liability insurance, competitive product markets with horizontal supply curves, and losses that are monetary equivalents.5
These conditions are seldom satisfied. Consumer information is not always perfect. Moreover, since health effects often involve losses that alter the structure of utility functions, consumers will value product safety even with full coverage of their financial losses. Product liability cost increases consequently increase the firm's costs and influence its risk-related decisions.
To assess the role of product liability costs, we structure the model in terms of the firm's unit profit function Ir, thus focusing on safety and innovation decisions rather than on quantity choice.6 The joint products of the firm constitute the choice variables and consist of the level of product safety s and the degree of product novelty z. The level of safety equals one minus the probability of injury.
A nonlinear hedonic price function consisting of a base product price p, a premium ctz for product novelty, and a liability cost f3(s, L) describes the unit price of the product. Consumers will pay more for product novelty (i.e., et > 0), and we define the scale of the novelty 5See Spence (1977) for exposition of such a model. See also Oi (1973 Oi ( , 1974 , Goldberg (1974), and Epple and Raviv (1978) . 6This simplification follows Spence (1977) . Expansion of the model to include a quantity choice is straightforward and yields predictable results: higher liability costs reduce output. However, addition of this consideration complicates the comparative static results by adding a third equation to the system. variable z with no loss of generality so that the novelty price premium is a simple linear function of (x and z.
The unit liability cost f3(s, L) decreases with product safety (ifs < 0) and increases with the stringency of the liability regime (AL > 0). In an absolute liability regime, where firms pay all expected injury costs, a linear formulation in which f3(s, L) = (1 -s)L is appropriate. In practice, various liability rules may make the liability cost function a nonlinear function of the level of safety s. Under a negligence standard, no liability exists unless the firm fails to provide a reasonable degree of safety, after which the firm becomes liable for all injury costs (see, e.g., Landes and Posner 1987; Shavell 1987; Polinsky 1989) . Even under strict liability, liability on the part of the firm arises only when the product fails a risk-utility test, which entails a balancing of the costs and benefits of greater product safety.7 Finally, firms that market risky products potentially subject themselves to punitive damages if they have been particularly remiss in providing for product safety. Another complication is that for very high levels of safety P(s, L) may equal zero.
The inputs necessary to produce safety s and product novelty z are given by g(s, z). The input requirements increase at an increasing rate with the value of each joint product (i.e., gs > 0, gZ > 0, go > 0, and gz, > 0). The unit cost of the inputs is r.
The firm selects the joint products s and z that maximize unit profits, or With a very stringent liability regime (i.e., a large value of L), the unit price curve becomes very steep, taking a form such as R1. This situation illustrates a corner solution at which the firm undertakes no product innovation expenditures and undertakes the maximum amount of safety expenditures on the transformation curve go.9 High levels of liability consequently may eliminate all innovation and lead firms to adopt designs without liability costs. Product engineers, for example, frequently note a bias toward accepted but somewhat risky designs rather than designs whose safety level is uncertain relative to the status quo. The observed effect may be withdrawal of the product altogether, as in the case of intrauterine contraceptive devices and some vaccines. These corner solutions play an important role in the empirical analysis. The directions of these effects will be apparent if we impose some additional structure. Suppose that 13sL < 0, as is the case with the linear liability cost term, 13(s, L) = (1 -s)L. Higher liability costs will necessarily raise product safety so that dsldL > 0. The product innovation effect depends on the effect of innovation on the firm's ability to produce safety. If innovation enables the firm to increase safety at less cost (i.e., g,, < 0), then dz/dL > 0. If, however, innovation makes it more difficult for the firm to produce product safety (i.e., g" > 0), then dz/dL < 0. If there is no interaction between safety and novelty in the input requirement function (e.g., g(s, z) = f(s) + h(z)), then g,. = 0 and dz/dL = 0; higher liability costs will affect safety investments but not product novelty. There has also been speculation that juries may be biased against innovative products, controlling for the level of safety and other factors. Such an anti-innovation bias will tend to decrease the incentive to innovate at higher levels of liability cost.10
These various results illustrate the mixed nature of the product liability-innovation linkage. Higher liability costs will increase product innovations directly related to safety improvements and also those that introduce new technologies if these technologies decrease the costs of providing safety. However, innovations that do not lower the marginal costs of providing safety will be depressed. In the case of extreme liability costs, product novelty will be eliminated altogether as the firm selects the no-risk corner solution.
The different components of the innovation process-safety innovations and product novelty-may consequently respond differently to increasing liability costs. If we could isolate these components empirically, it would be possible to distinguish the competing effects. Unfortunately, we observe only overall product R & D expenditures, or total product introductions. The available data do not indicate, for example, whether the new products represent safer variants of existing product designs or new product designs that alter attributes other than safety. Our empirical predictions consequently will be made in terms of the composite of innovative actions.
It should also be emphasized that no value judgments can or should be attached to whatever liability-innovation linkage we identify. Efficiency judgments regarding these outcomes depend on the character of the market failure and the nature of the liability regime-issues that have been explored in detail elsewhere."
III. The Sample and the Variables
We draw the data on firm-level decisions used in this study from two primary sources: one pertaining to product decisions and the other to insurance costs. We link these data on the basis of the pertinent three-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code.
Product Innovation Data
The product characteristics data consist of a broad panel of U.S. firms' business units known as the Profit Impact of Marketing Strategies (PIMS) data. These data, developed by the Strategic Planning Institute, contain both balance sheet and income statement items for sample lines of business. In addition to these data, the PIMS sample includes information on characteristics of the business unit's industry and a wealth of information on the strategies followed by the respondent firms. The PIMS data have been used by Ravenscraft and Scherer (1982) 
Product Liability Cost Measures
The product liability insurance cost measures are drawn from the complete rate-making files of the Insurance Services Office (ISO), an industry consortium for pooling insurance information. The information utilized pertains to product liability coverage purchased by firms for the years 1980-84. Consumers do not pay for this coverage except insofar as the cost is embodied in the product price. This rate-making data base contains over 200,000 records, where the unit of observation is the particular product liability insurance policy that has been written.12 Using the product categorizations (which parallel the SIC industry codes), we aggregated the information by industry group to establish a total product liability premium and total product liability loss amount for each three-digit industry code. These data are available for both bodily injury coverage and property damage coverage, and separate variables have been created for each of these components of liability costs. 13 We divide the aggregate premium and loss data by three-digit industry sales data from the Census of Manufactures. 12 We focus on insurance data for bodily injury and property damage claims using the entire ISO file of insurance premium rates and claims data for product liability coverage. The number of claims and valid records is substantial. For example, in 1980 there were over 20,242 claims involving bodily injury for which there are data on the loss levels. 13 The recent escalation in liability costs throughout the United States has primarily occurred for the bodily injury component (see Viscusi 1991b). Although these data represent by far the most extensive information pertaining to liability costs, they do not reflect all liability expenses. Firms that self-insure or obtain coverage through a company not affiliated with the ISO will not be represented in this sample. The data consequently provide a partial assessment of the total costs of liability to American industry and can best be regarded as an index of the relative distribution of liability costs across industries, as opposed to a measure of the absolute level of the liability burden.'4 The liability costs of a product risk to a firm generally consist of the premium costs, the legal fees, and the uninsured costs that may be imposed. Since the ISO data pertain only to premiums and losses, excluding uncovered costs, our measures should be viewed as a proxy for the full liability burden.'5 A policy written in any given year covers a 2-year period. In setting premium levels, the insurance adjuster relies on the manual rate for the product group and information about the firm's own loss history, as well as adjustments for the firm's current product mix. Premiums consequently are a measure of historical product risk levels and expected risk levels for the current product mix.
The second insurance measure represents losses experienced under a particular policy. Whereas premiums capture expected costs, losses reflect the liability costs actually incurred. These losses in turn will influence future premiums through the experience rating procedure. Losses are charged back to the initial policy year, so that a loss on a product sold in 1980 but for which the losses were incurred in 1983 will appear in the data as a loss in 1980.
For recent policy years (e.g., 1984), all claims that will ultimately be filed on policies written in that year are not yet known. However, these loss and claim levels can be projected using standard actuarial techniques. We have done this using the loss and claim projection factors developed by ISO. Table 1 (1991a, 1991c) . 15 If total costs are proportional to total premiums or total losses, then our two measures of insurance will have captured the full liability cost, up to a positive scale factor. This is clearly a best-case assumption that is unlikely to hold. The first set of liability influences that we explore pertains to the effect of product liability costs on R & D intensity. In the case of safety-related innovation expenditures, one would expect higher liability levels to increase the incentive to invest in safety improvements. Beyond some threshold, liability costs will depress innovation, since the firm will produce inherently risk-free products or withdraw the product. With respect to safety innovation expenditures, therefore, we expect a positive effect at low liability cost levels, which would eventually be dominated by a negative relationship between liability costs and innovation at higher cost levels. In the case of product novelty innovations, we expect higher liability costs to have a negative effect on such innovations through all levels of liability burdens unless they are safety-enhancing. A positive influence of liability on innovation (-Yl + 2-y21iability > 0) indicates a dominant safety effect, whereas a negative influence (-Yl + 2-y21iability < 0) reflects a dominant product innovation discouragement effect. In each case, we expect a negative effect of liability on innovation at high levels of liability (Y2 < 0).
Sample Characteristics

V. Empirical Results on R & D Intensity
The measures of innovative activity available in the PIMS data can be distinguished according to whether they represent the long-run levels of innovation (i.e., the product patent and technological change variables), current inputs into the innovation process (i.e., the product and process R & D intensity variables), or the current outputs of R & D (i.e., the new product variable). The hypotheses developed in Section IV described a number of expected influences on the R & D intensity variable, which reflects current R & D input decisions.
Our analysis considers four distinct measures of the expected product liability cost: premiums for bodily injury and for property damage relative to sales, and losses for bodily injury and for property damage relative to sales. The premium variables constitute more economically meaningful measures of the liability costs faced by firms. Most of the growth in liability costs in the 1980s related to bodily injuries. It appears that at very low liability cost levels, firms have incentives to invest in product safety research in order to reduce these costs, yet still introduce the product to the market. This is the safety incentive effect. When the liability cost levels become sufficiently large, the net effect is negative. This pattern may reflect a product withdrawal effect on safety innovation or a dominant negative influence of the adverse effects of liability on product novelty at high levels of liability. 18 We also estimated fixed and random effect versions of our model, controlling for first-order autoregression in the residuals. Because of the unbalanced nature of the PIMS sample, with many of the firms included in only one or two years, and the nature of the risk variable, which changes slowly over time within three-digit industries, we did not expect these techniques to yield precise results. This was borne out in the estimates. We thus rely on the cross-section estimates with time and industry dummies since they are more robust and remain unbiased in the presence of random effects and autocorrelation. The liability variables should be exogenous since they are predetermined. The average lag between the date of an injury and the date of claim closure is 1.5 years. There is an additional lag between the time of product sale and the date of injury. These lags make it unlikely that current R & D could affect recorded losses and premiums. We tested for the potential endogeneity of the liability cost variables using the Hausman (1978) specification test. Instrumental variables included all the explanatory variables, two-digit industry dummies, and the legal environment variables considered by Viscusi (1990) The strength of the liability cost effect should differ between process and product R & D. Process R & D focuses mainly on changes in the way that goods are manufactured and as a result relates primarily to the manufacturing defect doctrine. In contrast, product R & D and product-related patents relate more to design defects. Most legal scholars attribute the increased liability burden over the past three decades to the expansion of the design defect doctrine rather than to the role of manufacturing defects. Moreover, design defects pose the most substantial risks for a firm, since the firm will face liability for the entire product line rather than for the small percentage of the products that are subject to a manufacturing defect. As a result, for the R & D intensity equations, we expect a much stronger influence of liability on product-related innovation than on processrelated innovation. Table 3 There is also a high liability cost in the miscellaneous chemical products industry, SIC code 289. This industry produces, among other things, battery acid, fireworks, jet fuel igniters, and pyrotechnic ammunition, all of which are quite risky and associated with high liability levels.
In terms of the model above, -Yl
Also at or near the turning point for one or more of the liability variables are the rubber product industry, whose products include tires, a highly litigated product; pottery and related products, which produces bathroom fixtures and cooking ware; miscellaneous fabricated metal products, the industry in which safety valves of various types are produced; the metalworking machinery industry, in which products such as hand-held power tools, metal-cutting machine tools, and welding equipment are produced; the special machinery industry, in which sawmill machines, band saws, and food slicers are produced; electrical industrial apparatus; laboratory apparatus; and miscellaneous manufacturing. Of particular note is the miscellaneous manufacturing industry, whose products include book matches, which have been the subject of product safety regulation, and cigar and cigarette lighters, which are heavily litigated.
VII. Conclusions
The empirical relationship between product liability cost and research and development on new products suggests systematic linkages consistent with previous evidence on specific products such as vaccines. Product liability costs increase product R & D intensity initially, but the effect eventually becomes negative. Several manufacturing industries are located beyond the point at which R & D intensity is maximized. For these products, the same R & D level could be achieved for a lower product liability burden. However, this conclusion focuses only on average industry effects, not the composition of the R & D or the potential desirability of the withdrawal of some specific risky products.
It is not possible with our data to distinguish the effects of product liability on safety-related R & D expenditures and on the development of new varieties of the product. It is clear, however, that net expenditures on product R & D relative to sales rise with increases in product liability costs up to some level and that the portion of sales due to new products is similarly affected. We infer from these results that the development of new, safer products is the primary outcome engendered by the recent growth in the cost of product liability to firms. Whether these safety improvements represent efficiency gains depends on the underlying liability doctrines and their application by the courts.
The product liability-innovation relationship is much stronger for product R & D than for process R & D. This coincides with the prevailing view that expansion of the design defect doctrine, rather than the manufacturing defect doctrine, has contributed to the increased role of product liability. These results also suggest that our estimates are capturing the role of liability costs rather than some other aspect of product quality.
Although the findings presented here do not indicate the overall desirability of changes in legal rules, they do highlight clear-cut effects that may enhance or hinder overall social welfare. Perhaps even more important, they identify a strong relationship between liability and innovation that has made the courts a major player in the product innovation process. Viscusi 
